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The model in this paper characterizes the pattern of international trade, and technological innovation and 
imitation between industrialized and developing regions, when preferences are nonhomothetic. By and 
large, models of the dynamics of North-South trade impose the assumption of unit income elasticity for all 
consumption goods. This assumption is relaxed to incorporate the insight from Engel￿s Law: The budget 
share allocated to necessities falls with income. Since the composition of individual consumption depends 
on income, aggregate demand for newly invented goods depends not only on the distribution of income 
across countries but also within countries. To account for the impact of income distribution, preferences 
are intoduced where consumers rank indivisible goods according to a hierarchy of both needs and desires. In 
the model, the distribution of wealth is unequal in the less developed country and even in the industrialized 
country. Then, the composition of the aggregate consumption basket in the integrated economy depends 
on both inter- and intra-national inequality. Hence, a demand channel is identified through which inequality 
affects the international trade pattern. Empirical evidence from a panel of bilateral trade data among 58 
countries, for which adequate income distribution measures exist, and spanning three decades supports the 
conjecture that high inequality in a trading partner yields less bilateral trade flows through lower imports, 
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1   Introduction 
 
The dynamics of innovation and imitation between industrialized and less developed regions 
have been investigated in various contexts. The life-cycle structure of the location choice for 
production of newly invented goods over time, where relatively early manufacturing takes 
place in industrialized countries and gradually shifts to less developed countries, explored by 
Vernon (1966), has been formalized in models exploring technology diffusion to emerging 
economies (See e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1991). By and large, when it is not supposed 
that there is a representative consumer, the assumption of unit income elasticity is imposed 
for all consumption goods. Thus, any impact of income distribution on the level and 
composition of aggregate demand is ruled out.  
 
In this paper, the model incorporates the fact that income elasticity with respect to newly 
invented goods is larger than the income elasticity with respect to older ones. The 
assumption is that more recently introduced goods yield less utility because they satisfy less 
urgent requirements. They fulfill desires rather than needs. Then wealth distribution 
determines aggregate demand. This follows from the insight of Engel￿s Law: The budget 
share allocated to necessities decreases with income. As observed by Linder (1961), once the 
difference in expenditure decisions between rich and poor consumers is acknowledged, the 
trade pattern between industrialized and less developed regions is determined not only by 
differentials in technology, factor endowments and income but also by income distribution 
within each region. To account for the impact of income distribution, we introduce 
nonhomothetic preferences in an innovation-imitation model of an integrated world 
economy.  
 
The specification of preferences used is that introduced by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1989), and by Zweimueller (1998) in a dynamic setting, where consumers rank goods 
according to a hierarchy of needs and desires. The configuration of demand for newer goods 
across households depends on the range of affordable consumption. Aggregate demand for 
different types of goods is determined by the income distribution within and across regions.  3
The equilibrium pattern of trade is given not only by technology primitives, factor 
endowments and relative per capita incomes, that is inter-regional income distributions, as in 
standard trade theory but also by intra-regional income distributions as pointed out by 
Linder.  
 
In the model, we assume that the distribution of wealth is unequal in the poor region and 
even in the prosperous region. This assumption is consistent with the stylized evidence on 
distribution and development. Hence, our distinction is meant to capture broad modern 
regional dichotomies of the global North-South or the European East-West type. In 
particular, we explore the effect of changes in the distribution of wealth within the poor 
region on the pattern of trade of the integrated economy. The inclusion of nonhomothetic 
preferences in the model brings about a demand channel through which income distribution, 
not only between countries but also within trading partners, affects international trade flows. 
The configuration of global exports will be determined by regional demands for different 
types of goods.  
 
The effect of wealth inequality in the less developed on trade is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, since only the rich in the less developed region can afford imported luxurious goods, 
progressive wealth redistribution leads to a contraction of trade, other things equal. This 
would occur because the redistribution of wealth is associated with an attendant fall in 
demand for relatively new goods. On the other hand, if the poor are made wealthier, their 
range of consumption increases. Then, the varieties of goods produced in the less developed 
country, and therefore exports, grow. This would occur because the redistribution of wealth 
is associated with an attendant rise in demand for more recently imitated domestic goods. 
  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 sets up 
the primitives of the model: endowments, preferences and technology. Section 4 derives the 
strategic linkages between innovators and imitators under free entry. Section 5 characterizes 
the steady-state equilibrium of the integrated economy, with particular emphasis on the 
pattern of trade and income distribution. Section 6 presents the results from the econometric 
analysis of panel data on bilateral trade flows among 58 countries over three decades on the 
impact of inequality on imports and total trade. Finally, Section 7 concludes.  4
 
 
2 Related  Literature 
 
Although the impact of international inequality has featured in both the modeling and 
empirical studies of trade under nonhomothetic preferences, the impact of intra-national 
inequality has been largely neglected. The present paper aims to bridge this gap in both the 
theory and empirics of international trade. In this section, we review the existing theoretical 
and empirical research about the impact of inequality on international trade when the 
composition of household consumption depends on income, and aggregate consumption for 




In his now classic treatise, Linder (1961) points out that the dependence of the composition 
of a household￿s consumption basket on its income means that aggregate demand for 
different types of goods is determined by income distribution. In fact, while with homothetic 
preferences demand for any good only depends on aggregate income, with nonhomothetic 
preferences the attendant demand for new goods is higher when there are more well off 
households. Therefore, with fixed costs of innovation, countries with a higher concentration 
of wealthy households manufacture varieties of the most recent vintages. Some of these 
varieties are exported from industrialized to less developed countries if enough consumers 
find them affordable. In particular, bilateral trade will be determined not only by the 
differences in technology and endowments, as well as the similarity in aggregate incomes, but 
also by both inter- and intra-national inequality. 
 
International differences in per capita income are the focus of trade models by Markusen 
(1986) and Ramezzana (2000). The former combines monopolistic competition and factor 
endowment differentials with nonhomothetic preferences. Capital is abundant in the 
industrialized country and goods with high income elasticity are capital intensive. The latter 
model also combines monopolistic competition with nonhomothetic preferences but  5
introduces transportation costs. Hence, in both models, trade is mostly among countries 
with higher per capita income. The volume of trade falls with international inequality.  
 
The literature on economic development emphasizes the importance of demand expansion 
for the adoption of increasing returns technologies that are not viable in small markets. For 
example, Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) highlights the key role of productive agriculture in 
generating demand for manufactures and spurring industrialization. But, as Baldwin (1956) 
points out, the aggregate demand for manufactures may not manifest itself if the wealth 
generated in agriculture is extremely concentrated. Therofore, intra-national inequality can 
affect industrial structure. 
 
The idea that the emergence of a middle class is needed, as the source of purchasing power 
for manufactures, is modeled by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989). Given that agricultural 
expansion enlarges the middle class, progressive redistribution unambiguously stimulates 
industrialization through the expansion of demand that makes it possible for manufacturers 
of new varieties to cover fixed costs. A role for exports of primary goods is allowed akin to 
that of agriculture, as generators of the resources that spur industrialization. Luxury imports 
are considered as detrimental for domestic manufacturing and a negative byproduct of 
inequality. 
 
By contrast, in the model of the present paper, imports by the rich households in the less 
developed country are the counterpart of exports to the industrialized country. Without 
￿luxury￿ imports by the rich, the less developed country manufacturers suffer a drop in their 
demand because exports cease. Furthermore, international trade facilitates adoption of 
advanced technologies by manufacturers in the less developed country.  
 
In a related model, Matsuyama (1999) considers a Ricardian model of trade in which the less 
developed country specializes in goods with low income elasticity, and the industrialized 
country has comparative advantage in goods with high income elasticity. As above, 
consumption is discrete for each good and satiation is reached after the first unit. Utility rises 
with the diversity of the consumption bundle rather than with the intensity of consumption 
of each good. While preferences are nonhomothetic, there is perfect competition. Hence,  6
income distribution has impact on industrial structure only through its effect on trade, 
without any pecuniary externalities of demand to allow for start-up cost coverage. 
Redistribution from rich to poor consumers in the less developed country reduces exports 
and imports if the ensuing rise in the terms of trade due to the shift in demand is bounded. 
 
Given that early goods provide more utility and that only the first unit of consumption of 
each good provides utility, the more rich consumers there are the higher the aggregate 
demand newer goods. In the model of this paper, like in the model of Murphy, Shleifer and 
Vishny, redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor can stimulate demand for 
domestic manufactures and increase the range of exportable goods in the less developed 
country. But also, as in Matsuyama￿s model progressive redistribution reduces import 
demand from the less developed country, and therefore total trade flows. Hence, the impact 






With regard to the link between the diversity of the consumption bundle and income, 
Jackson (1984) finds evidence of a positive correlation among household income and variety 
of goods in its consumption basket. Hunter and Markusen (1988) explore the link between 
national per capita income and the composition of demand. The estimation of a linear 
expenditure system for thirty four countries and eleven commodity groups yields a rejection 
of the null hypothesis of homothetic preferences at significance levels of 1%. 
   
Also, Francois and Kaplan (1996) find that the composition of imports depends on intra-
national inequality. Countries with more unequal distributions tend to import more 
consumer manufactures. However, they do not explore the effect of intra-national inequality 
on either the level of imports or the pattern of bilateral trade. In the present paper, the 
importance of the Gini coefficient in explaining both bilateral imports and total trade flows 
is explored empirically. Even after controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity of 
both trading partners, as well as geographic location variables, the lagged Gini coefficient of 
the receiving country is negatively correlated with bilateral imports. Also the lagged Gini  7
coefficient of the country running a bilateral trade deficit is negatively correlated total trade 
flows. 
   
Deardorff (1998) points that if preferences are nonhomothetic and goods with high income 
elasticity are capital intensive, as in Markusen (1986), the gravity model of bilateral can 
account for the direction of bilateral flows, as long as the relative per capita income is added 
as an explanatory variable. But, the prediction that capital abundant countries trade mainly 
with each other, while capital scarce countries do the same, is not borne out. For example, 
Frankel, Stein and Wei (1996) find that high-income countries trade disproportionately with 
all countries, not just other high-income countries. The relevance of intra-national inequality 
is neglected in estimations of the gravity equation. In the present paper, regressions of the 
bilateral trade pattern include national inequality. 
 
 
3  The Building Blocks 
 
In this section the building blocks of the model are laid out. First, the preference structure is 
specified following Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) and Zweimueller (1998). We build in 
Engel’s Law. Second, the endowment structure is characterized. Next, the necessary first-
order conditions implied by household optimization are used to write the individual and 
aggregate consumption functions. Finally, the innovation, imitation and manufacturing 





The model is set up as in Kugler and Zweimueller (1999). The analysis to follow is based on 
the static equilibrium. The economy is made up of two countries, A and B, populated by L
A 
and L
B inhabitants respectively. Country A is relatively more prosperous and industrialized 
than country B. Preferences are defined over consumption goods. It is assumed that all 
consumers, independently of their income and their nationality, have the same preferences. 
 
  8
Lifetime utility of a household of type h in country i is given by, 
 











which is the discounted flow of instantaneous utility from consumption of each infinitely-
lived household. 
 
There is a continuum of goods indexed by 
+ ℜ ∈ j . A hierarchy of necessity and desirability 
ranks these goods according to their priority. For all goods, we assume that there is 
indivisibility in consumption and that utility is derived only from the first unit consumed, at 
each point in time. Households consume conveniences only after basic needs are met. 
Goods satisfying necessities are indexed in the unit interval,  ) 1 , 0 [ ∈ j , and yield one unit of 
utility for the first unit consumed. All other goods  1 ≥ j  provide amenities for the first unit 
consumed, at each moment 
+ ℜ ∈ t , worth 
j
1
 units of utility. 
  
If prices are not decreasing in  j , then each household will consume goods according to the 
priority specified by the hierarchy. Given equal prices, as j increases each unit of utility from 
consumption becomes more costly. Hence, no good  1 ≥ j  will ever be demanded by a 
household until all goods indexed below j have been consumed. Although the decisi￿n-making 
criterion has a lexicographic structure, the consumption function is continuous and otherwise well-
behaved by construction. Note that there exists a continuum of goods and that the index of last good 
consumed is pari passu a measure of consumption because only one unit of each good is consumed. 
Indeed, instantaneous utility is given by, 
 




















where  ) (t C
i
h  is the highest index of all goods consumed at time 
+ ℜ ∈ t .  




3.2 Endowments   
 
Each household in country A has identical financial asset holdings V
A. In country B, there 
are two types of households, rich and poor. The proportion of poor households is β . Per 
capita wealth from financial assets is V
B. Each poor household wealth is  ) ( ) ( t V t V
B B
P α = .  
Now,  
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and therefore, the financial holdings of each rich household are given by, 
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The law of motion of the state variable for each type of household is, 
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where r is the world interest rate and wages are determined nationally.
2 The prices depend 
only on the location where the goods are manufactured. Goods manufactured in country A 
are set as numeraire. Goods manufactured in Country B are cheaper and priced at  1 < p . 
The more recent the invention a good the higher its index 
+ ℜ ∈ j . The goods manufactured 
in country A are those which since their introduction have not been imitated in country B. 
We assume that  ) (t N  goods have been introduced at time 
+ ℜ ∈ t  and  ) (t M imitated. Then 
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1 The distribution of wealth is depicted in Figure 1.  10
We will focus in the case in which (i) households in the relatively prosperous country A 
purchase all invented varieties, (ii) the rich but not the poor in the less developed country B 
can afford imported ￿luxury￿ goods, and (iii) the poor can afford more than the basic 
subsistence goods but not all domestically manufactured goods. Hence, we have, 
 





A C t M t C t C t N . 
Since utility is logarithmic, it turns out that the asset distribution is stationary under the 
present specification of preferences. In particular, the ratio of savings to the value of asset 
holdings is independent of the level of wealth. The share of wealth of each group is fixed. 
 
 
3.3 Intertemporal  Optimization   
 
Consumer demand for each household type depends on the range of affordable goods. The 
demand structure is graphed in Figures 2 and 3.In particular, solving the intertemporal 
optimization problem of each consumer yields the following consumption functions, 
 
    N M p V W C
A A A = − + + = ) 1 ( δ     (1), 
 
for country A households, 
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δ    (2), 
 
for rich households in country B, and 
 















                                                                                                                                                 
2 Labor supply is inelastic. 
3 We are concentrating in the steady state without growth, whih implies that   0 / = − = δ r c c  .  11
4  Innovation and Imitation 
 
To complete the specification of the primitives of the model, we provide the elements that 
determine the cost structure of manufacturing in each region. First, in the rich economy, 
there is a sunk cost stemming from the resource requirement for innovative design. The 
marginal cost of producing each unit gives the mark-up equation. Second, in the developing 
economy, there is a fixed cost associated with reverse engineering. Limit pricing together 
with the variable cost define the mark-up relationship for imitated products. These technical 
parameters together with the aggregate demand functions determine the free-entry 
equilibrium conditions in each region. 
  
 
4.1   R&D Primitives 
 
Each firm in country A has exclusive use of a blueprint. Perfect intellectual property 
protection prevails in country A. But, entrepreneurs in country B can reverse engineer a 
design without compensating the creator. The deployment cost of R&D ventures 
is ) (t F units of labor. Once a design is made, the firm can manufacture each unit using 
) (t A units of labor and acquire a monopoly position for the corresponding good. We assume 
symmetry in the technology across goods.  
 
There is an upper bound on the price to be charged by each incumbent firm. We normalize 
this limit price to unity. The limit on the price is due to potential production by a 
competitive fringe. Once invented any good can be produced using a ￿backyard￿ technology 
that has requires  ) ( / 1 t W
A  units of labor to produce each unit of output under constant 
returns, where  ) ( / 1 ) ( t W t A
A > . Hence, the incumbents￿ price determines the reservation 
wage.  
 
In particular, since we have normalized the price of country A manufactures to unity, the 
marginal revenue product of labor using the ￿backyard￿ technology is  ) (t W
A . If an 
incumbent monopolist tried to bid the wage below that level, the competitive fringe could 
enter without incurring sunk costs and offer slightly higher wages to attract all the required  12
workers to serve the whole market. No incumbent will ever pay a wage lower than the 
reservation level  ) (t W
A . With a wage rate  ) (t W
A  and a price of unity, the profit flow per 
unit of output sold is  ) ( ) ( 1 t W t A
A A − = π . The following assumptions summarize the 
evolution of technical opportunities: 
 
  ) ( / ) ( ), ( / ) ( t N a t A t N f t F = =  and  ) ( ) ( t N w t W
A A = .  
 
We assume that productivity growth in the relatively prosperous country is driven by 
innovations. We adopt the simplest way to capture this idea by assuming that the stock of 
knowledge in the economy can be proxied by the measure of previous innovations  ) (t N  
and the labor input requirement of R&D is inversely related to this measure. Moreover, we 
assume productivity in final output production, by both incumbents and the competitive 
fringe, also increases with  ) (t N , which is an index of past manufacturing as well. 
 
Hence, efficiency in R&D and production, both manufacturing and backyard, rise pari passu 
with the number of goods introduced. Innovators, entrepreneurs and workers build upon 
experience of previous successes. The assumption about the impact of new ideas, or designs, 
on future innovators follows Romer (1990). Learning leading to higher productivity ceases if 
innovation stops, as in Young (1993). While the wage rate grows with the measure of 
previous innovations, the profit flow per unit sold remains constant over time as,  
 
                                                 
A A A aw t W t A − = − = 1 ) ( ) ( 1 π . 
  
 
4.2      Emulation Primitives 
 
 
Firms in the less developed country B do not have access to the innovation technology. To 
become manufacturers they emulate producers from the innovating country A. Imitation 
requires set-up costs of  ) (t G units of labor. After a good has been imitated in country B, 
imitators can produce at constant marginal cost  ) ( ) ( t W t B
B , where  ) (t B  is the labor input  13
necessary to produce one unit of output using the imitation technology and  ) (t W
B  is the 
wage rate in country B. We will discuss later on the endogenous determination of  ) (t W
B . 
  
Technological change for imitation activities evolves analogously to that in innovating 
activities. In particular, we assume that, 
 
  ) ( / ) ( t M g t G =  and  ) ( / ) ( t M b t B = .  
 
This characterization of the progress of emulation technologies states that efficiency is 
determined by the history of imitating activities  ) (t M . Productivity in the blueprint imitation 
and adaptation process increases as a result of learning from reverse-engineering experience. 
Successful design copying not only adds to the productivity of further imitation but also 
leads to more efficient production due to the associated increase in manufacturing 
experience. 
  
In order to be competitive in the world market, country B producers have to underbid 
country A firms. The lowest price at which country A firms are willing to sell is their 
marginal cost 
A aw . If a country B firm charges a slightly lower price, it can take over the 
whole world market and drive the country A competitors out of the market. However, the 
country B firms will only be able to do so if their marginal cost is below that of country A 
producers. Or equivalently, we assume 
B A bw aw > , where  ) ( / ) ( t M t W w
B B = denotes the 
country B wage rate normalized by the measure of previously imitated goods. We obtain the 
mark-up for imitating producers by invoking limit pricing. In order to capture the market the 
imitator has to underbid the price of the current producer. The limit price (i.e., the price 
which drives the country A firm out of the market) is slightly below the marginal cost of the 
country A firm and the profits per unit sold are thus, 
  
                                                 
B A B A B bw aw t W t B t W t A − = − = ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( π . 
  
 
4.3      Innovation   14
 
The free entry condition in country A is given by, 
 
                                 τ β π τ π
τ τ d e L L d e L t W t F
t r B A
T
T
A t r A
T
t




− − − − − + + =   , 
 
where  1 T  is the time at which rich consumers from country B can afford the good 
introduced at time t and  2 T is the time at which that good is imitated an all rents start 
accruing to the imitator. 
 
In general, if all variables grow at a common rate γ , we have that, 
 
                                  ) ( ) (
) ( 1 t N e t C
t T B
R =
− γ           and                 ) ( ) (
) ( 2 t N e t M
t T =
− γ , 
so that, 

















− + = γ   . 
 





fw = .  
 
 
4.4    Imitation 
 
The free entry condition in country B is given by, 
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where  3 T  is the time at which poor consumers from country B can afford the good imitated 
at time t . 
  15
In general, if all variables grow at a common rate γ , we have that  ) ( ) (
) ( 3 t M e t C
t T B
P =









− + = γ . In particular, if we concentrate in the steady state in which no growth 
occurs, we have that 
δ





= .   
 
 
Proposition 1  The equilibrium wage in country B falls as the fraction of poor 
households in country B rises, and as the discount rate gets higher. Also, the wage increases 
as efficiency, in both imitation and manufacturing, increases in country B, as the cost of 
manufacturing in country A rises, and as the world population expands. 
 
Proof:  Using the mark-up expression, we find the wage in country B as, 
 
     
) ) 1 ( (











=     (4),   
 
and the stated results follow directly.        
    ❑ 
 
The wage that satisfies the free-entry condition in country B essentially rises with the 
profitability of imitation. In particular, the higher the fraction of poor households, the 
smaller the market for high-income elasticity imitated manufactures. The ensuing fall in the 
wage causes a further contraction in the market size because the income of all country B 
household decreases, and so does the range of affordable manufactures. Hence, a low 
industrialization trap of the type highlighted by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) can 
arise. In the present set up, this causes a fall in exportable varieties because of limited supply 
of manufactures by country B and also limited demand for newly innovated goods. 
Therefore, higher inequality stemming from a higher fraction of poor households can have a 
contractionary effect on world trade through the wage effect outlined. Both countries lose 
out because more expensive manufacturing of relatively old goods takes place in country A, 
thereby reducing the availability of resources for innovation.  16
 
 
5  The Integrated Economy 
 
In order to characterize the steady state we have to describe the implications of our 
assumptions on preferences and technology for innovation, imitation, and trade. We 
assumed that only in country A there is access to the innovation technology. The innovation 
equilibrium is one where the present discounted value of future profits accruing from an 
innovation is equal to the fixed cost of discovery. Firms in the country B do not have access 
to the innovation technology, but there are no barriers to entry in imitation activities. The 
imitation equilibrium characterization is analogous to the free-entry condition for country A 
innovators. 
 
The values of innovation and imitation success in steady-state equilibrium were derived 
under the following conditions. Consumers choose optimally the size and the composition 
of their consumption basket. The savings are invested in assets until there are no unexploited 
profit opportunities left, in the sense that neither further incentives to innovate nor to 
imitate with higher intensity exist. Finally, labor markets have to clear and the current 
account has to balance. In the steady state without growth, current account balance entails 




5.1  Resource Balance Constraints 
 
We find the labor market equilibrium in both countries. Since labor is the only factor of 
production, this is enough to characterize worldwide resource balance. Labor is demanded 
for innovation, imitation and production. In equilibrium, the wage in country A is 
determined by the reservation wage derived from the backyard technology. The equilibrium 
wage in country B clears the labor market.  
 
  17
5.1.1  The Less Developed Economy 
 
Since labor supply is inelastic, labor demand is equal to the population in labor market 
equilibrium. In particular, in country B, work is divided between reverse engineering and 
production, 
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which can be written as, 
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From here, we obtain the steady-state per capita wealth in country B as, 
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5.1.2  The Industrialized Economy 
 
In country A, the labor force is divided into R&D activities and manufacturing, with no 
￿backyard￿ production in equilibrium.  Hence, 
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β γ .   18
 
 
Proposition 2  The equilibrium per capita wealth in country A rises with the 
efficiency of manufacturing in country B, with the range of goods produced in country B, 
and for a given degree of imitation, with the fraction of poor households in country B, 
because the size of the market for innovations is smaller. Furthermore, the per capita wealth 
difference among countries falls with the discount rate and the gap between rich and poor in 
the less developed country. 
 
Proof:  From (5), we obtain the steady-state per capita wealth in country A as, 
 











bL L b t V + = − − − = ) (
) (
)) 1 ( 1 ( ) (    (6), 
and the stated results follow. 
                  ❑  
 
Progressive redistribution from rich to poor in the less developed country favors imitators 
while hurting innovators. While a rise in the discount rate reduces the present discounted 
value of innovation and imitation. The latter, having a longer horizon, face a sharper fall in 
value.  A drop in imitation, as for example discussed in connection to Proposition 1 when 
the proportion of poor households rises, affects country A household adversely because 
their consumption bundles become more expensive. This in turn means that less resources 
are available for innovation. Somewhat paradoxically, imitation spurs innovation.  
 
 
5.2    Current Account Balance 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, we will concentrate in the case in which 
income differences between countries are relatively large, so that the poor in the less 
developed country cannot afford any imported varieties.  ) (t M  goods are produced in 
country B and all these goods are exported as all households in country A can afford them. 
The price of these goods is 
A aw . So the value of total country A imports (in terms of the  19
numeraire goods produced in country A) is therefore given by 
A A L t M aw ) (  The demand for 
exports is given by the number, and wealth, of rich consumers in the country B country. 
Only this group is assumed to be able to afford imported luxury goods. The level of 
consumption of this group is  ) (t C
B
R so the value of exports country B is
B B
R L t C ) 1 )( ( β − .  
 
In the steady state, the current account balance can therefore be written as, 
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where  the expression in brackets is the optimal consumption of the rich in country B 
derived in (2).  
 
 
Proposition 3  The integrated economy will have an equilibrium with international 
trade if the mark-up of manufactures from country A is sufficiently small and the population 
of country B relative to that of country A is sufficiently large. Moreover, the degree of 
manufacturing and exports in country B rises with the wage.  
 
Proof:  Now, if we plug in the equilibrium wage and per capita assets in country B obtained 
in equations (4) and (5) from the free-entry and resource balance conditions, we obtain the 
range of goods produced in country B as,  
 
B w t M
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= ) (                                                (7), 
where, 
                [] )) 1 ( ( ) ) 1 ( 1 ( 1 b b
L
L
b b aw B
A
A A − + − − − + + + − = βα µ β α β ξ , 
 
where 
A µ  is the price mark-up of goods manufactured in country A, that is the marginal 
cost over the price, and  ) 1 ( α β − = Γ   is the Gini coefficient derived from the wealth  20
distribution in country B.
4 If the conditions stated in the Proposition are satisfied, then the 
last expression is positive and so is the range of goods produced in country B.  ❑   
 
 
Imposing an upper bound on the mark-up of country A amounts to limiting the magnitude 
of the price of imitated manufactures. This makes them affordable to more consumers, 
thereby expanding market size for imitators, as does a large population in country B. A large 
population in country B relative to country A also ensures that there will be some demand 
for imports from country B, even if the fraction of poor households is large, while 
households from the industrialized country always consume all goods produced in the less 
developed country.  
The positive feedback between wage rises and manufacturing expansion in the less 
developed country illustrates the role of nonhomothetic preferences in bringing about a 
demand channel whereby income distribution determines industrial activity and the pattern 
of trade. If less inequality induces more production in the less developed country, the 
industrialized country benefits also because, as explained above, imitation stimulates 
innovation.  Yet, inequality may stimulate growth as imitation follows innovation, and in 
particular, rises in ￿luxury￿ imports. 
 
 
5.3   The Pattern of International Trade 
 
In the steady state, this economic system is characterized by the household optimization 
rules, by the industrial organization among innovators and imitators in equilibrium, by 
resource balance, and by the balance of trade described in the last section.  
   
Now, we analyze the determinants of international trade. Total trade flows will be derived in 
terms of the primitives of the model. In particular, we want to explore the impact of the 
distribution of wealth in country B. Define total trade flows as total exports,  
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B B
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4 See Appendix 8.1.  21
Proposition 4  Total trade flows in the integrated economy do not change 
monotonically with variations in the wealth distribution parameters. While inequality 
contracts the export supply of the less developed country, it also expands its import demand. 
The net effect is ambiguous. 
 
 
Proof:  Plug in the equilibrium wage and per capita assets in country B obtained in equations 
(4) and (5), together with the range of production in country B derived in equation 7, to 
obtain the steady-state total trade flow as, 
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where the expression for total trade clearly does not vary unambiguously with changes in the 
distribution parameters α  and β .                  
 
           ❑   
 
 
The effect of inequality emphasized in the first three propositions points to a contraction in 
trade due to less imitation, and indirectly less resources for innovation. Proposition 4 
introduces a direct effect of inequality in expanding the market for innovators through 
higher imports from the less developed country. In equilibrium, higher imports from the less 
developed country entail higher exports to the industrialized country. Hence, in the dynamic 
model of international trade, nonhomothetic preferences induce two offsetting effects from 
intra-national inequality. In order to learn more about the impact of inequality on 
international trade, we turn next to analyze the empirical evidence. Once the importance of 
national inequality for bilateral international trade in the sample is ascertained, the net effect 




6  Evidence on Inequality and Bilateral Trade 
 
 
In this section, the gravity equation approach is used to analyze the impact of national inequality on 
international trade flows. The graphical evidence in Figures 4 and 5 hints at the negative effect of 
inequality on trade, through its impact on import demand. First, preliminary regressions of bilateral 
import demand and export supply functions are fitted controlling for factors affecting the 
commercial interaction among the two countries, as well as unobserved heterogeneity of both the 
importing and exporting country. Second, gravity equations are estimated incorporating national 
inequality in both countries, and separately controlling for unobserved heterogeneity of the richer 
and the poorer country respectively. 
 
The database on bilateral trade is described by Frankel and Wei (1995).5 It covers bilateral trade 
among 3,906 exporter-importer pairs (63 countries) in 1970, 80, 90 and 92, their nominal GNPs, per 
capita GNPs and bilateral distance.  It comprises information on imports and exports by country of 
origin, the income and population of each country, as well as characteristics of geographic 
impediments to trade between pairs of countries, which was matched to data on national inequality 
for each country. Data on each country￿s Gini coefficient for the years in question were available for 
58 of the 63 countries from the data compiled by Deininger and Squire.6 
 
 
6.1  Import Demand and Inequality 
 
The first regression fits import demand on variables capturing observable characteristics 
affecting bilateral trade and each country￿s Gini coefficient, GNP and per capita GNP. The 
fixed effects estimation controls for unobserved and persistent idiosyncratic characteristics 
of the country that imports. The results in Table 1 show that while the income distribution 
of the exporting country is irrelevant, the income distribution of the importing country is 
significant and negative. That is, inequality lowers import demand. A 1% drop in the Gini 
coefficient is associated with a 0.65 % rise in imports.  
 
                                                 
5 See, http://www.nber.org/~wei/trade  23
 
Not only are the regressions controlling for unobserved heterogeneity but also the right 
hand variables are lagged. Therefore, we cannot attribute this finding the fact that high 
inequality is positively correlated with other features that hinder imports. The results from 
the random effects specification, in which unobserved heterogeneity is transitory, are in 
Table 2. The Hausman specification test in Table 3 of systematic differences in the estimated 
coefficients rejects the random effects regression in favor of the fixed effects estimation.  
 
It could be that some countries tend to trade more with countries that have more egalitarian 
income distributions, independent of their own distribution, for reasons not captured by the 
regressor variables. In particular, gravitational forces in international trade may have a 
technical as well as an institutional component. To complement the results in Table 1, an 
export supply function is fitted with the same regressors but using a fixed effects 
specification that controls for unobserved and persistent characteristics of the exporting 
country. The estimated coefficients are in Table 4. Also, a random effects specification 
assuming transitory unobserved heterogeneity was fitted. The results are in Table 5. While 
the Hausman specification test in Table 6 clearly favors the fixed effects regression, both 
estimations show inequality in the exporting country to be highly insignificant.  
 
Inequality in the importing country remains highly significant but the estimate of the 
elasticity of national imports to the Gini coefficient drops in absolute value to 0.48. A 
negative effect of inequality on exports is consistent with the model. While progressive 
redistribution may shrink the fraction of income allocated to rich consumers of ￿luxury￿ 
imports, higher demand for more recent imitated goods by poor consumers induces a rise in 
both the wage and per capita wealth of country B. Hence, the rich get a smaller share, 
compared to the initial allocation, from a larger product. The rich can then expand their 
import consumption range, more than compensating for the smaller share of income 




                                                                                                                                                 
6 See, http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2000/pdfs/tab2_8.pdf   24
6.2  Total Bilateral Trade and Inequality 
 
It has been established empirically, for the sample of 58 countries under consideration, that 
inequality in a country lowers its imports without any systematic effect on its exports. Now, 
it will be ascertained whether the impact on imports carries over to total bilateral trade. For 
these gravity regressions countries are ranked by per capita income starting with the highest. 
For any pairing ij, country i always has higher per capita income than country j. The results 
in Table 7 are obtained by considering persistent effects due to unobserved characteristics of 
the richer countries. Three new regressors are included. These variables pick up the Gini 
coefficient, GNP and per capita GNP of the country with a trade deficit in the bilateral 
exchange. While the income distribution of the rich country is insignificant after controlling 
for its unobserved characteristics, income inequality in the poor country per se is associated 
with more total trade. However, if the poor country imports from more than it exports to 
the rich country, then higher inequality leads to less total international trade flows. The 
elasticity of total bilateral trade with respect to inequality of countries with lower GNP per 
capita, and running trade deficits, is ￿0.28. Bilateral exchange is significantly reduced by 
inequality in a trading partner but the effect is dampened when compared to the sheer effect 
on imports.  
Finally, the estimation of the gravity equation is performed controlling for unobserved and 
persistent characteristics of the poorer country in the trade relationship. Inequality in the 
poor country per se turns insignificant instead of being positively correlated with trade flows. 
The same happens with GNP and per capita GNP. Now if the country with the lower per 
capita GNP runs a trade deficit with the richer country, less inequality, a higher national 




7 Conclusions   
 
As observed by Linder (1961) in his classic study, once the difference in expenditure 
decisions between rich and poor consumers is acknowledged, it follows that the trade 
pattern between industrialized and developing countries is determined not only by factor  25
endowment and cross-regional income differentials, as in the Hecksher-Olin-Samuelson and 
intra-industry trade models, but also by national income distributions. The incorporation of 
Engel’s Law into the preference structure provides a role for national income distribution to 
determine the composition of import demand, and therefore the international trade pattern.
7  
  
The model of the integrated economy, in which innovation takes place in the industrialized 
country and imitation in the less developed country, incorporates nonhomothetic 
preferences. The industrialized country has higher income per capita and a more even 
income distribution than the less developed country. While inequality may lead to more 
trade, through higher imports, it can also contract exports by lowering the extent of 
domestic manufacturing because of lower demand. In equilibrium, redistribution has an 
ambiguous net effect.   
 
An augmented gravity equation is estimated in which national inequality is included, various 
types of unobserved heterogeneity are controlled for and a special role for the country 
running a trade deficit is allowed. The results show that in the sample of 58 countries, for 
which reliable Gini coefficients are available over three decades, international trade flows are 
higher when national inequality is lower. The results are quite robust to the control of 
various types of unobservable heterogeneity, which is generally persistent.   
 
These results demonstrate the role of national income inequality as a crucial, if neglected, 
determinant of international trade. The aim has been to show how income distribution, 
within as well as across countries, by shaping the composition of aggregate demand impacts 
international trade. The significance of inequality in explaining bilateral trade patterns, when 
preferences are nonhomothetic, has been established both theoretically and empirically. 
                                                 
7 Kugler and Zweimueller (1999) study the effect of inequality on international growth, under nonhomothetic preferences.  26
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8 Appendix 
8.1 Wealth  Distribution 
 













The Gini coefficient is the area between the identity line, perfect equality, and the Lorenz 
Curve, giving the percentage of wealth owned by a given percentage of the population. The 
shaded area in the graph corresponds to this measure of inequality. In particular, normalize 
the are below the diagonal so that,  
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8.2 Consumer  Demand 
 
 



























λ : Shadow Value of Wealth. 
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t:      innovation time 
T2 :  imitation time  31
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Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 7148
Group variable (i) : i Number of groups = 58
R-sq: within = 0.6995 Obs per group: min = 19
between = 0.2384 avg = 123.2
overall = 0.5647 max = 177
F(13,7077) = 1267.23
corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.0352 Prob > F = 0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IMPORTSij| Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
DISTANCE | -.6942325 .0286229 -24.254 0.000 -.7503419 -.6381231
BOTHAPEC | 1.671377 .0953699 17.525 0.000 1.484423 1.85833
ONEAPEC | .4667906 .0500521 9.326 0.000 .3686735 .5649078
HKORSING | .4347359 .1753933 2.479 0.013 .0909127 .7785592
WESTHEM | 1.198301 .0988047 12.128 0.000 1.004615 1.391988
ADJACENT | .497194 .0963623 5.160 0.000 .3082951 .6860929
LANGUAGE | .5315383 .0496536 10.705 0.000 .4342024 .6288741
GINI i | -.6540001 .20824 -3.141 0.002 -1.062213 -.2457874
GINI j | .0352501 .0849377 0.415 0.678 -.1312532 .2017534
GNP i | .8697632 .0133058 65.367 0.000 .8436796 .8958464
GNP j | .8328905 .0128045 64.266 0.000 .8077941 .8579867
PCGNP i | .2041027 .0272805 7.482 0.000 .1506247 .2575807
PCGNP j | .3445702 .0168075 20.501 0.000 .3116224 .3775179




rho | .51570432 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0: F(57,7077) = 88.07 Prob>F=0.0000 33
Table 2
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 7148
Group variable (i) : i Number of groups = 58
R-sq: within = 0.6993 Obs per group: min = 19
between = 0.3058 avg = 123.2
overall = 0.5816 max = 177
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian Wald chi2(13) = 16311.33
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IMPORTSij| Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
DISTANCE| -.7088604 .0286457 -24.746 0.000 -.765005 -.6527159
BOTHAPEC| 1.661595 .0957685 17.350 0.000 1.473892 1.849297
ONEAPEC | .4817824 .0500387 9.628 0.000 .3837083 .5798566
HKORSING| .4303998 .1763467 2.441 0.015 .0847665 .7760331
WESTHEM | 1.174346 .0990967 11.851 0.000 .9801205 1.368572
ADJACENT| .4897403 .0969302 5.053 0.000 .2997607 .6797199
LANGUAGE| .5200788 .049873 10.428 0.000 .4223296 .6178281
GINI i | -.8988843 .1946852 -4.617 0.000 -1.28046 -.5173084
GINI j | .0358301 .0853804 0.420 0.675 -.1315124 .2031726
GNP i | .8630616 .0133598 64.601 0.000 .8368768 .8892463
GNP j | .8297633 .0133058 65.367 0.000 .8036796 .8558464
PCGNP i | .2493413 .0263411 9.466 0.000 .1977138 .3009689
PCGNP j | .3398445 .0168989 20.110 0.000 .3067232 .3729658










IMPORTSij| Effects Effects Difference
---------+-----------------------------------------
DISTANCE | -.6942325 -.7088604 .0146279
BOTHAPEC | 1.671377 1.661595 .0097823
ONEAPEC | .4667906 .4817824 -.0149918
HKORSING | .4347359 .4303998 .0043361
WESTHEM | 1.198301 1.174346 .0239549
ADJACENT | .497194 .4897403 .0074537
LANGUAGE | .5315383 .5200788 .0114594
GINI i | -.6540001 -.8988843 .2448843
GINI j | .0352501 .0358301 -.00058
GNP i | .8328905 .8297636 .0067016
GNP j | .8697632 .8630616 .0067016
PCGNP i | .2041027 .2493413 -.0452386
PCGNP j | .3445702 .3398445 .0047256
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2( 13) = (b-B)'[S^(-1)](b-B), S = (S_fe - S_re)
= 49.16
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 35
Table 4
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 7148
Group variable (i) : i Number of groups = 58
R-sq: within = 0.6895 Obs per group: min = 27
between = 0.3319 avg = 123.2
overall = 0.5523 max = 175
F(12,7078) = 1310.08
corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.0566 Prob > F = 0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXPORTSij| Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
DISTANCE | -.8937787 .0250568 -35.670 0.000 -.9428976 -.8446597
BOTHAPEC | 1.191062 .0927713 12.839 0.000 1.009203 1.372922
ONEAPEC | .3326972 .0481058 6.916 0.000 .2383954 .4269989
HKORSING | .3689404 .1723801 2.140 0.032 .0310239 .7068569
WESTHEM | .8333391 .0957815 8.700 0.000 .6455787 1.0211
ADJACENT | .5299293 .0482527 11.811 0.000 .4353397 .624519
LANGUAGE | .5641316 .0483255 11.674 0.000 .4694146 .6588473
GINI i | .1069954 .2026886 0.528 0.598 -.2903349 .5043258
GINI j | -.4870956 .0867225 -5.617 0.000 -.6570976 -.3170935
GNP i | .8128905 .0128045 64.266 0.000 .7977941 .8379867
GNP j | .8264954 .0127864 64.639 0.000 .8014303 .8515605
PCGNP i | .4194079 .0263698 15.905 0.000 .3677153 .4711006
PCGNP j | .1464208 .0171792 8.523 0.000 .1127444 .1800972




rho | .5631899 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0: F(57,7078) = 109.09 Prob>F=0.0000 36
Table 5
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 7148
Group variable (i) : i Number of groups = 58
R-sq: within = 0.6895 Obs per group: min = 27
between = 0.3592 avg = 123.2
overall = 0.5606 max = 175
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian Wald chi2(12) = 15684.36
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXPORTSij| Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
DISTANCE | -.8987311 .0250477 -35.881 0.000 -.9478237 -.8496386
BOTHAPEC | 1.194352 .0928956 12.857 0.000 1.01228 1.376425
ONEAPEC | .3447884 .0480637 7.174 0.000 .2505852 .4389916
HKORSING | .3684504 .172698 2.133 0.033 .0299686 .7069322
WESTHEM | .828063 .0958331 8.641 0.000 .6402336 1.015892
ADJACENT | .5200788 .049873 10.428 0.000 .4223296 .6178281
LANGUAGE | .5641314 .0483255 11.674 0.000 .4694146 .6588473
GINI i | .1127696 .1954166 0.065 0.948 -.2957791 .2702399
GINI j | -.4923866 .0868892 -5.667 0.000 -.6626863 -.322087
GNP i | .8228904 .0128045 64.266 0.000 .7977941 .8479867
GNP j | .8755891 .1981664 4.570 0.000 .4870476 .9941311
PCGNP i | .4445518 .0258861 17.173 0.000 .3938161 .4952876
PCGNP j | .14367 .0172118 8.347 0.000 .1099355 .1774045










EXPORTSij| Effects Effects Difference
---------+-----------------------------------------
DISTANCE | -.8937787 -.8987311 .0049525
BOTHAPEC | 1.191062 1.194352 -.0032902
ONEAPEC | .3326972 .3447884 -.0120913
HKORSING | .3689404 .3684504 .00049
WESTHEM | .8333391 .828063 .0052761
ADJACENT | .5241316 .5200788 .0040528
LANGUAGE | .5699293 .564131 .0057984
GINI i | .1069954 .1127696 -.0057742
GINI j | -.4870956 -.4923866 .0052911
GNP i | .8128905 .8228904 -.0099999
GNP j | .8264954 .8228904 .003605
PCGNP i | .4194079 .4445518 -.0251439
PCGNP j | .1464208 .14367 .0027508
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2( 12) = (b-B)'[S^(-1)](b-B), S = (S_fe - S_re)
= 45.24
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 38
Table 7
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 3369
Group variable (i) : i Number of groups = 57
R-sq: within = 0.7857 Obs per group: min = 2
between = 0.4983 avg = 59.1
overall = 0.7410 max = 170
F(16,3296) = 755.10
corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.0905 Prob > F = 0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTTRADEij| Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
DISTANCE | -.7072502 .0280994 -25.170 0.000 -.7623442 -.6521563
BOTHAPEC | 1.600493 .0847851 18.877 0.000 1.434257 1.76673
ONEAPEC | -.6646207 .2683821 -2.476 0.013 -1.190833 -.1384082
HKORSING | .5198653 .0456675 11.384 0.000 .4303258 .6094048
WESTHEM | .7921349 .0970731 8.160 0.000 .6018052 .9824646
ADJACENT | .5441098 .0923489 5.892 0.000 .3630428 .7251768
LANGUAGE | .6452698 .0472909 13.645 0.000 .5525472 .7379924
GINI i | .3103716 .2712568 1.144 0.253 -.2214773 .8422204
GINI j | .4646067 .0959799 4.841 0.000 .2764204 .652793
GNP i | .9055891 .1981664 4.570 0.000 .5170476 1.294131
GNP j | .7074166 .0163083 43.378 0.000 .6754412 .7393919
PCGNP i | -.6455658 .2152589 -2.999 0.003 -1.06762 -.2235111
PCGNP j | .2310558 .0186839 12.367 0.000 .1944226 .267689
DGINI ij | -.7407607 .1017938 -7.277 0.000 -.9403462 -.5411752
DGNP ij | .0682432 .0177396 3.847 0.000 .0334615 .1030249




rho | .68760642 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0: F(56,3296) = 27.58 Prob>F=0.0000 39
Table 8 
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 3369
Group variable (i) : j Number of groups = 57
R-sq: within = 0.7914 Obs per group: min = 4
between = 0.5067 avg = 59.1
overall = 0.6440 max = 143
F(16,3296) = 781.49
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.1368 Prob > F = 0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTTRADEij| Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
DISTANCE | -.9410296 .0302071 -31.153 0.000 -1.000256 -.8818031
BOTHAPEC | 1.081797 .0999408 10.824 0.000 .8858452 1.27775
ONEAPEC | .408205 .0565621 7.217 0.000 .2973045 .5191055
HKORSING | .4332478 .16986 2.551 0.011 .100206 .7662897
WESTHEM | .4205478 .0968738 4.341 0.000 .2306089 .6104867
ADJACENT | .2766568 .0967818 2.859 0.004 .0868983 .4664153
LANGUAGE | .5493785 .0492445 11.156 0.000 .4528256 .6459313
GINI i | -.2922337 .1014263 -2.881 0.004 -.4910985 -.0933688
GINI j | -.1747095 .1090828 -1.524 0.116 -.3885864 .0391673
GNP i | .8639809 .0151578 56.999 0.000 .8342613 .8937005
GNP j | -.1892749 .1135799 -1.666 0.096 -.4119692 .0334194
PCGNP i | .5688443 .1329551 4.278 0.000 .3081614 .8295273
PCGNP j | -.3876532 .1090828 -1.602 0.109 -.6885864 -.2391673
DGINI ij | -.7435173 .106744 -6.965 0.000 -.9528085 -.534226
DGNP ij | .3759596 .0188669 4.026 0.000 .2896694 .8295111
DPCGNP ij| .5787932 .020327 3.876 0.000 .0538938 .1186479




rho | .67668962 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0: F(56,3296) = 21.33 Prob>F=0.0000
 